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CONFLICT OF LAWS IN LABOR MATTERS
IN THE UNITED STATES*
STUART ROTHMAN**
The problems in Conflict of Laws concern, in part, the questions of how
far a state may through its legislative and executive departments govern
the legal consequences of acts done in that state or elsewhere and questions
concerning over what persons a state may exercise authority; or problems
may concern the question of what law is to be chosen by the courts to
settle a disputed matter where certain foreign elements have come into
the case.1
In line with this definition, a sampling of the ways in which the
subject of conflict of laws has been treated in the United States in
labor matters will be undertaken. However, the term "labor matters"
may be regarded as embracing a multitude of topics, and this presen-
tation by no means purports to be encyclopedic.2 Indeed, questions
concerning conflicts between laws of the federal and state governments
have been purposely excluded, though admittedly they loom large in
domestic law and jurisprudence. On the other hand, the subjects
considered are deemed illustrative of the domestic approach to the
problems involved.
It may be said in general that the courts are reluctant to give extra-
territorial effect to statutes in the absence of a specific legislative direc-
tion to do so. This seems to be true even in the field of workmen's
compensation statutes, which perhaps involve the most distinctive
*Prepared in its original form for use at the Second International Congress
of Labor Law in Geneva, Switzerland, September 1957.
**General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board; Solicitor, U. S. De-
partment of Labor, 1953-59; B.A., LL.B., University of Minnesota; LL.M.,
Harvard University; Littauer Fellow, School of Public Administration, Harv-
ard University. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of the National Labor Relations Board. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. J. Gilmer Bowman, Jr., for his
assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (3d ed. 1949).
2. While employment is based on contract, conflict of law rules do not ap-
pear to have played a significant part in reported judicial considerations of
alleged breaches of employment contracts. This may be attributed to at least
four factors. A large percentage of employment contracts are made and per-
formed in the same state. Controversies over alleged breaches which might
involve conflict of law questions may be settled by private agreement or arbi-
tration. Others may be resolved by the application of federal legislation which
would not involve conflict problems, and those cases which may be litigated in
courts apparently have not reached appellate levels where definitive decisions
might be rendered. However, there seems to be no reason to suppose that
courts would not follow the general rules of conflict of laws in contract matters
in cases involving employment contracts. See Cary v. U. S. Hoffman Mach.
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1957). For a presentation of these conflict
of law rules in contract matters, see, e.g., 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
1042-284 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 304-47 (3d ed. 1949).
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development of conflict of laws rules. Such an approach is necessitated
by traditional concepts of the comity of nations, i.e., a reciprocal re-
spect for the right of each sovereign to determine the legal effect of
acts within those areas under the sovereign's control.
The judicial treatment accorded two federal labor statutes is illus-
trative of this approach. For example, the Eight-Hour Law3 requires
that "every contract" for construction to which the United States is a
party must contain a provision that no laborer or mechanic doing any
part of the work contemplated by the contract shall be required or
permitted to work more than eight hours per day unless he is paid
one and one-half times the basic rate of pay for hours worked each
day in excess of eight. An American construction company with a
government contract for construction work abroad employed an
American citizen in the United States to work at the construction site,
and an action was brought to determine the applicability of the Eight-
Hour Law to the contract. The United States Supreme Court held
that "every contract" did not mean contracts for construction abroad
and the statute therefore imposed no obligation on the contractor to
comply with its terms in connection with this construction project
in a foreign country.4 The Court refused to give extra-territorial effect
to the statute in the absence of a clear congressional directive to do so.
But Congress was found to have given such a directive in the
Fair Labor Standards Act,5 which provides for the payment of mini-
mum wages and overtime pay to certain employees engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce or in the production of goods for such com-
merce. The act, for present purposes, may be said to cover employees
within the continental United States, its territories and possessions;
and the Supreme Court has held6 that Congress intended the term
''possessions" to include the Government's leasehold interests in
foreign countries, thereby bringing employees on these leaseholds
within the coverage of the act, even though the United States Gov-
ernment concededly had no sovereign authority over the leaseholds.
7
Further illustrations of legislative and judicial treatment of con-
flict of laws problems are found in connection with employees' work-
connected injuries, the rights of seamen, and labor-management
relations.
3. 27 Stat. 340 (1892), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26 (1952).
4. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
5. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952).
6. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
7. Pub. L. No. 85-231, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 Stat. 514 (1957), 29 U.S.C. §
213 (Supp. V, 1958) restricted the effect of this decision by eliminating the
application of the act to territories and leaseholds of the United States in
foreign countries.
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I. STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
Workmen's compensation acts make an employer responsible for
bodily injury to an employee arising out of and, in the course of his
employment, and liability is imposed without regard to fault on the
part of the employer or the employee. Each state of the United States
has such a statute, but there is a wide variance in the methods utilized
in their administration and the theories underlying their coverage
provisions, including provisions giving a majority of these statutes
extra-territorial effect.
Characterization has been the traditional approach to conflict of law
questions, and once a characterization has been made, such as tort,
contract, or property, reasonably well-established rules and principles
are available for determining the applicable law. However, in the
field of workmen's compensation, no less than three characterizations
have been employed: tort, resulting in application of the law of the
place of injury; contract, resulting in application of the law of the
place of contracting, performance or place intended by the parties; and
a new category, the employer-employee relationship or status, re-
sulting in the potential applicability of the law of any jurisdiction
having a sufficient connection with this relationship or status. Though
characterization is largely a matter of state law, the restraints and
limitations imposed by the due process and full faith and credit8
clauses of the United States Constitution are factors to be considered
in a state's choice of law.
There are fundamental inconsistencies between the concepts under-
lying workmen's compensation and the theories on which the tort
and contract characterizations rest. Consequently, the employer-
employee relationship or status has been increasingly popular for
the development of conflict of law principles in this area because it
comports more nearly with the concept of workmen's compensation.
However, conflict of law problems in the field of workmen's compensa-
tion entail the consideration of a number of subjects.
A. Enforcement in One State of a Compensation Claim under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of Another State.
The vast majority of the workmen's compensation acts are ad-
ministered by special administrative tribunals expressly created for
that purpose, though a few are administered in state courts. Because
of substantive or procedural variations in these state acts, including
the powers of the administering agency, the prescribed procedure, and
8. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note 485-86 (1934);
Note, Enforcement in One Jurisdiction of Right to Compensation under




the relation of the remedy to the method of obtaining it, in the
majority of the cases it has been impossible for an injured workman
to receive a compensation award in one state under the act of another
state. As succinctly put by the Restatement:
A Workmen's Compensation Act usually calls for the award of com-
pensation by a particular administrative tribunal provided by the Act.
Frequently, the provisions of the Act are such that, until the award is
made, there is no right in the injured workman which is capable of
being the subject of suit in an ordinary court. Even if under a particular
Act the injured workman has a claim against the employer rather than
a right to make application for an award to a local tribunal, the difficulties
of procedure may make it impracticable for a court in another state to
attempt to administer the Act. Therefore, no award is ordinarily made
under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of a foreign
state. If an award has been made in a state under the local statute, a
suit may be brought in another state on the award.9
This statement apparently is equally applicable to enforcement of
a claim in one state under the court-administered act of another.10
B. Successive Recoveries of Compensation Awards under the Acts
of More than One State
Although a compensation award may not ordinarily be obtained
in one state under the statute of a foreign state, it does not follow
that an award can be obtained in a single state only." An award under
the act of one state will not necessarily bar a subsequent award under
the applicable act of another state. In this connection, it should be
noted that a state's insistence on applying its own act or none at all,
as well as the possibility of obtaining multiple awards, violates one
of the cardinal principles of conflict of laws rules, i.e., the choice of a
forum should be as insignificant as possible in the outcome of a case.
It is possible that by express provision or judicial interpretation
a state act or an award under it may be the exclusive remedy, or award
for an employee's injury. In this event, the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution has been held to preclude
another state from granting an award under its own act.12 But this
basic rule has given rise to, and given way in, a staggering amount
of litigation. Courts usually find that an award in one state is not
9. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note 485-86 (1934).
10. See Note, Enforcement in One Jurisdiction of Right to Compensation
under Workmen's Compensation Act of Another Jurisdiction, 6 VAND. L. REV.
744 (1953), where most of the cases are gathered and discussed. Although the
statutes of some states authorize the administrative agency to provide benefits
under the act of another state, this does not appear to have had any particular
importance. Id. at 749 n. 15.
11. 2 LARSON, WORK-WIN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 85 (1952).
12. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Bradford Elec.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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intended to be the exclusive award for the injury or that the
foreign state's act is "obnoxious" in view of the act of the forum
state,13 and this enables more than one state to grant an award be-
cause of a particular interest in the employer-employee relationship
concerned. 14 Thus it becomes necessary to determine the bases for
the application of one state's act to a work-connected injury which
is compensable under the act of another state.
C. Bases for Application of the Act of the Forum
Whether a state's act is to apply to work-connected injuries oc-
curring inside or outside its borders is primarily a question for the
state legislatures and courts to determine. However, when foreign
contacts are involved, this freedom of determination is bounded by
the due process and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution.
Though the Supreme Court has attempted to delineate these bounds
in a series of cases since 1932, the Court's efforts seem not to have
been entirely successful. From a highly legalistic initial approach,15
the Court has moved to the view that the "governmental interests" of
a state must be weighed in determining whether that state may apply
its act in a compensation case with foreign contacts. 16 Its interest
must be more than casual, and states in which the employment
contract was entered, where the injury occurred, and where there
was a substantial relationship with the employment relationship have
been found to have such an interest. It has also been suggested that
a state would have an interest sufficient to support the application of
its act if it were the place where the industry was localized, the
employee's residence, or the state whose statute the parties adopted
by contract.17 Therefore, it becomes extremely difficult to determine
whether the interest of a state with a contact with a work-connected
injury is merely casual, thereby prohibiting it from making the
remedies provided by its act available to the injured employee or
his survivors.
An employee who enters a contract of employment in one state may
13. It is, of course, largely a fiction to say that one state regards another
state's workmen's compensation act as obnoxious since all these statutes, no
matter how varied their terms, are designed to accomplish the same basic
purpose. However, the doctrine has been useful in cases involving the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution as a method of enabling a state
having a legitimate interest in a work-connected injury to apply its statute
even though the statute of another state might also be applicable. See Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); and
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
14. Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
15. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
16. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
330 U.S. 469 (1947).
17. 2 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 86.10.
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recover a compensation award under the act of that state for a work-
connected injury in another state18 unless the act applies, by express
provision or interpretation, only to injuries occurring within the
state.19 Such awards may be granted on either of two theories. First,
by making the employment contract in the state, the parties are re-
garded as having agreed to accept coverage under the act.20 Second,
the act may be viewed as establishing a mandatory regulation of an
incident of the employer-employee relationship, thereby bringing the
parties within its coverage by virtue of their having entered the em-
ployment contract in the state 21 If such an act purports to provide
exclusive coverage for employment-connected injuries, domestic as
well as foreign, coverage under it may even be used as a defense
to a tort action in a second state if that latter state does not find its
provisions obnoxious and has no more than a casual interest in the
employment relationship.2
A workman may also recover a compensation award in the state
where his injury occurred under the act of that state5 unless that
act, by specific provision or interpretation, applies only when the
employment contract was made in the state and he did not enter his
employment contract there.24 Thus it is possible for an injured work-
man to be unable to recover a compensation award at all if the act of
the state where he made his employment contract applies only to
injuries occurring within that state and the act of the state where
the injury occurred applies only if the employment contract was
made there. 5 But this is not to say that the employee would be
entirely without a remedy since presumably an action in negligence
would still be available to him under the law of the state where
the injury occurred. As a practical matter, however, such a remedy
is more apparent than real since in order to recover the employee
would have to surmount the "unholy trinity" of defenses, the doctrines
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk and the fellow-
servant rule.
Compensation has also been awarded an injured employee under
18. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935);
Haverly v. Union Constr. Co., 236 Iowa 278, 18 N.W.2d 629 (1945); Sweet v.
Austin Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 381, 171 Atl. 684 (1934).
19. In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913).
20. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Ati. 372 (1915).
21. GooDIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 284 (3d ed. 1949).
22. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). Indeed,
this appears to be the only possible present interpretation of Bradford Elec,
Light if that case is not to be regarded as having been overruled sub silentio
by Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
23. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939).
24. House v. State Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 167 Ore. 257, 117 P.2d 611 (1941).
25. Ibid.
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the act of a state which was neither the place where the employ-
ment contract was made nor the place where the injury occurred.
This award was bottomed on the interest of the state in the employ-
ment relationship and was made because of the existence of the em-
ployment relationship in the state.2 Too, the localization of an em-
ployer's business in a state has been held to be a sufficient basis
for making the act of that state applicable to an employee's injury
incurred outside that state even though the employment contract was
made in still another state.21 And in a leading casen the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld a compensation award under the
District of Columbia's act for an injury sustained outside the District
because of the substantial connection between the District and the
employment relationship. The employee resided in the District, and
the employer's place of business was located there. The fact that the
employment contract had been made in the District was simply dis-
regarded.
D. Tort Actions Against the Employer
If an action in tort or for wrongful death against an employer has
been abolished by the act of the state where the injury occurred,
the general rule is that no action for such tort or wrongful death
will be entertained anywhere.29 And under the traditional doctrine
of lex loci delicti commissi, this would certainly appear to be the better
view.
But it seems that such actions may also be precluded in certain
circumstances by virtue of the act of the state where the employment
contract was entered even if such actions would ordinarily be per-
mitted under the act of the state where the injury occurred. 3 This
might result if the state where the contract was made purported to
provide the exclusive remedy for the injury, whether it occurred
within or without the territorial jurisdiction of the state, and the
state where the suit was brought had not declared such an act obnox-
ious to its own policy of allowing tort actions and its connection with
the employment relationship was casual.3' In this connection, it has
26. McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 212 Wis. 507, 250
N.W. 396 (1933).
27. Severson v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines, 105 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1939).
28. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
29. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 401 (Supp. 1948).
30. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
31. Compare Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), with
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S.
622 (1947); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939); Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933). Whether
this result is required by the full faith and credit clause is open to question.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Carroll v. Lanza, supra, would seem to lead to
the conclusion that the state where the injury occurred could use its discretion
in the matter since its interest in the injury, but not necessarily in the em-
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been said that "it is generally held that, if a damage suit is brought in
the state of injury by the employee against the employer, the state of
injury will enforce the bar created by the exclusive-remedy statute of
the state of contract or employment relation. '32
If a work-connected injury occurred in a foreign nation and a
workmen's compensation award was paid in a state which barred tort
actions for such injuries, it has been held that it would be against
the public policy of the state, as evidenced by its acts, to entertain
a suit based on the foreign cause of action.3
E. Rights Against Third Parties
Employees at times receive work-connected injuries through the
fault of a third person, who may be liable for damages in a tort or
wrongful death action. Those denominated third persons differ
from state to state, and this is particularly true with respect to
fellow employees and general and subcontractors, though for present
purposes the term may be regarded as embracing the latter. An em-
ployer or his insurer will ordinarily be subrogated to the rights
of an employee against a third person, but the extent of the sub-
rogation and the time it arises also vary from state to state. It is
therefore important that employers, employees and third persons
be able to determine their rights or obligations if more than one
state has a legitimate interest in the employment relationship of
an employee who has sustained a compensable injury. The questions
involved may be approached by considering the situation before com-
pensation has been awarded and that after an award has been made.
1. Before a Compensation Award.-When more than one state has
a legitimate interest in a work-connected injury and a compensation
award has not been made, it would be expected that the act of the
state where the injury occurred would be determinative of an em-
ployee's rights against a third person and the subrogation rights
of the employer and his insurer.34 However, even though the state
where the injury occurred might permit an action in tort or for
wrongful death against a person under its own act, it might refuse
ployment relationship, is regarded as more than casual. Hence, the holding
in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, supra, must be viewed as being suscep-
tible of this interpretation or else overruled sub silentio in Carroll v. Lanza,
supra.
32. 2 LARsox, op. cit. supra note 11, § 88.10.
33. Urda v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 211 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1954).
34. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Jonathan Woodner Co. v.
Mather, 210 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954); Bagnel v.
Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735
(1944); 2 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 88.23.
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to entertain such an action if the act of the state where the contract
was made was applicable and would bar the suit. 3
2. After a Compensation Award.-If the state where the injury
occurred had abolished an action in tort or for wrongful death against
a third party and compensation had been awarded under the law
of that state, the general rule, again following the doctrine of lex loci
delicti commissi, is that no such action against a third party could be
maintained in any state. 6 Consequently, there would be no question
of the right of an employer or his insurer to subrogation under the
usual rule.
If the state where the employment contract was made barred an
action against a third party and a compensation award had been
paid in that state, the state where the injury occurred will ordinarily
dismiss an action against the third party.37 However, if both states
35. Stacy v. Greenberg, 9 N.J. 390, 88 A.2d 619 (1952).
36. Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 221 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1955);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 401 (Supp. 1948). In Wilson v. Faull, 27
N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958), the plaintiff was employed by a New Jersey
subcontractor to work on a project in Pennsylvania, where he was injured
through the general contractor's alleged negligence. The Pennsylvania statute
made general contractors liable to the employees of subcontractors for work-
men's compensation and abolished their tort liability. The employee collected
workmen's compensation in New Jersey from his immediate employer, the
subcontractor, and brought an action there against the general contractor for
negligence, which was permitted under the New Jersey statute. The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania statute would have given
the general contractor a defense to such a suit in Pennsylvania and that the
defense should be recognized in New Jersey since the Pennsylvania law
was not obnoxious, though contrary, to the law of New Jersey. The court
also stated that this rule should be followed whether the forum state is the
place of the contract, injury, or employment relationship.
37. 2 Larson, op. cit. supra note 11, § 88.22. But see Sheerin v. Steele, 240
F.2d 797 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957), in which an employee's
administratrix brought a wrongful death action in Michigan against a fellow
employee of deceased for alleged negligence in causing the employee's
injury and death in Michigan. The contract of employment had been made
in Ohio and stipulated that the New York Workmen's Compensation Act would
be applicable to a work-connected injury, which was permissible under Ohio
law. The employee lived in New York. The widow, who was also the
administratrix, collected workmen's compensation under the New York
compensation statute, which barred a suit against a fellow-employee for
negligence in causing a work-connected injury or death. Then she brought
this action in Michigan, whose workmen's compensation act barred an action
against a fellow employee if compensation were "payable" under that act.
The court of appeals interpreted the act as meaning that the benefits of the
act had to be retained before such an action would be barred. They had not
been, and so the court held that the action could be maintained and that
Michigan was not bound under the full faith and credit clause to recognize
a defense to the suit based on the New York act. Apparently only the full
faith and credit clause question was before the court of appeals. Having
determined that the full faith and credit clause did not require Michigan to
recognize the New York law as a bar to the action, it did not overtly
consider whether the Michigan state courts would recognize a defense based
on the New York statute. Rather, it merely reversed the trial court's determi-
nation of the constitutional question and remanded the cause for further
proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.
1959 ] 1005
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would permit the action and compensation had been paid in one
state, then any right to subrogation would ordinarily be determined
under the act of that state if any action were brought in the other
state.38 Thus, if the act of the state where compensation was awarded
would assign the employee's cause of action to the employer or his in-
surer, the state where the injury occurred would probably recognize
the effect of the assignment. This would have the beneficent effect of
preventing the third person from being liable both to the employee in
the state where the injury occurred and to the statutory assignee of
the employee's right of action in the state where compensation was
awarded.
II. FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LiAmiTY AcT
The Federal Employers' Liability Act,39 hereinafter referred to as
FELA, is a federal statute providing an action in negligence for work-
connected injuries of employees of interstate rail carriers. The act
covers a carrier's employee if any part of his duties as such an em-
ployee are in the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce or in
any way directly or closely and substantially affect such commerce.
Whereas workmen's compensation statutes provide compensation for
work-connected injuries on a liability without fault basis, this act
is not a compensation act. It provides a remedy by way of a suit in
state or federal courts for damages based on negligence. The employer
may not defend the suit by resort to the assumption of risk and fellow
servant defenses, and a concept of comparative negligence is substi-
tuted for the common law concept of contributory negligence. As a re-
sult, while the employee's negligence contributing to his injury may
be considered so as to reduce the amount of damages he may
recover, it will not necessarily preclude recovery of all damages.
As one commentator has said:
Since the Act is an expression of the pre-eminent federal power over
interstate commerce, it is exclusive of state action in respect to work in-
juries insofar as it has by its terms covered the field. Exactly how much
of the field it has covered has been an extremely prolific source of
litigation ever since its enactment in 1908.4o
The problem of the exclusion of state workmen's compensation rem-
edies by FELA coverage, a problem of federal pre-emption, is beyond
the scope of this discussion. However, it is relevant to consider the
applicability of the act both to injuries sustained in a foreign jurisdic-
tion by employees of a domestic carrier and to injuries sustained
within the territory of the United States by employees of foreign
rail carriers.
38. 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 11, § 88.22.
39. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
40. 2 LAasoN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 91.10.
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The last point may be disposed of first. Although no case in
point has been found, there appears to be no reason to suppose
that the FELA would not be applicable in the event of an injury
within United States territory to an employee of a foreign rail
carrier if the employee's duties within the territory were in the
furtherance of or affected interstate or foreign commerce.
Unlike many state workmen's compensation laws, the FELA has
no extra-territorial effect. In the case in which this was determined,
41
a rail carrier's employee was killed in Canada while engaged in
foreign commerce. Both the carrier and the employee were citizens
of the United States, and suit was brought in this country under the
FELA to recover damages for the death. The United States Supreme
Court held that the act was based on tort and provided no cause of
action for an injury occurring outside the territory of the United
States. There was nothing in the act indicating an intention to give
it extra-territorial effect. Accordingly, the Court followed its usual
rule of construction that: "'Legislation is presumptively territorial
and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdic-
tion' Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195."42 In this connection,
the Court quoted from the leading case on the point:
The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done .... For another jurisdiction, if it should
happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions
rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be
unjust, but would be an interference with the authority .of anothe
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state con-
cerned justly might resent . . . . The foregoing considerations would
lead in case of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be
confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power. All legislation is prima facie
territorial. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356,
35743
Consequently, the Court held that the availability of a remedy would
have to be determined by the laws and statutes of the country where
the alleged act of negligence occurred, which in this case was Canada.
One other case is worthy of mention. In Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Wright4 it was held that a recovery could not be had under the FELA
for the death of an employee of a Canadian railroad in the operation
of a railroad car ferry on territorial waters of the United States.
41. New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
42. Id. at 31.
43. Id. at 31-32.
44. 21 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1927), affd per curiam, 278 U.S. 577 (1929). Because
of the authority cited by the United States Supreme Court for its per curiam
affirmance, the opinion of the court of appeals is reduced to the status of mere
dicta.
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The court found that by treaty the territorial waters of the United
States and Canada are absolutely free to citizens of each country.
This ferry, though registered in the United States, was chartered to
the Canadian railroad and was not shown to be operated by it in a way
which would make the operation incidental to the railroad's status
as a rail carrier within the United States. If the facts had been other-
wise, the FELA would presumably have been applicable. The court
followed the general rule that the boats of one country in the terri-
torial waters of another are subject to the laws of their own country
in all matters of "internal discipline and management," and that
domestic laws displace the vessels' home laws only as to navigation
rules and matters distinctly pertaining to police powers. Hence,
Canadian rather than domestic law was determinative of any remedy
for the employee's death.
III. THE RIGHTS OF SEAMEN
Full consideration of the domestic impact of conflict of law rules
on the rights of seamen would be impracticable in a brief paper.
Therefore, consideration will be limited primarily to the application
of domestic law in cases involving seamen's injuries and the collection
of wages.
The domestic approach to questions of conflict of laws in maritime
cases may be gleaned from an excerpt from Mr. Justice Jackson's
opinion reviewing the application of domestic law to seamen's injuries:
But the virtue and utility of sea-borne commerce lies in its frequent
and important contacts with more than one country. If, to serve some im-
mediate interest, the courts of each were to exploit every such contact
to the limit of its power, it is not difficult to see that a multiplicity of con-
flicting and overlapping burdens would blight international carriage by
sea. Hence, courts of this and other commercial nations have generally
deferred to a non-national or international maritime law of impressive
maturity and universality. It has the force of law, not from extra-
territorial reach of national laws, nor from abdication of its sovereign
powers by any nation, but from acceptance by common consent of
civilized communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable
commercial relations.
International or maritime law in such matters as this does not seek
uniformity and does not purport to restrict any nation from making and
altering its laws to govern its own shipping and territory. However, it
aims at stability and order through usages which considerations of comity,
reciprocity and long-range interest have developed to define the domain
which each nation will claim as its own. Maritime law, like our municipal
law, has attempted to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws
by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and
the states or governments whose competing laws are involved. The
criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at from weighing of the signifl-
cance of one or more connecting factors between the shipping trans-
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action regulated and the national interest served by the assertion of
authority. It would not be candid to claim that our courts have arrived
at satisfactory standards or apply those that they profess with perfect con-
sistency. But in dealing with international commerce we cannot be
unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be
avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient
to warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically
be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an
American transaction. 45
A. Seamen's Injuries
In general, the lex loci delicti commissi applies to torts against
seamen while serving on a ship.4 If, however, only the internal
economy or discipline of the ship is affected, the law of the flag will
ordinarily be used to determine liability for such torts.47 But perhaps
the principal problem with which domestic courts have been con-
fronted is the applicability of the Jones Act8 to seamen's injuries.
The Jones Act makes the remedies provided in the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, discussed above, applicable, with the right
to trial by jury, to injuries sustained by seamen in the course of
their employment. But the Jones Act does not alter the ancient and
traditional rights of seamen to maintenance and cure and to wages
so long as the voyage continues. In the domestic view, these rights
are contractual in nature,49 whereas a suit under the Jones Act is
in tort.50
The act covers seamen injured on an American vessel regardless
of the place of injury or the nationality of the seamen, and it has
been applied when an American seaman was injured on a foreign
vessel in the territorial waters of the United States.51 If, however,
an American seaman is injured on a foreign vessel outside the United
States' territorial waters, the law of the flag of the vessel is used
to determine the nature of his right to relief, if any.52 But it is in-
teresting to note that in a case in which an American seaman was
injured on the high seas on a vessel of foreign registry owned by one
American citizen and operated by another, the seaman was permitted
a recovery against the owner under the Jones Act.
53
45. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953).
46. The Hanna Nielsen, 273 Fed. 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 653
(1921). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 404 (1934).
47. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 405 (1934).
48. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
49. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); The Montezuma, 19
F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1927). See also The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
50. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
51. Shorter v. Bermuda & West Indies S.S. Co., 57 F.2d 313 (D.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1932).
52. The Oriskany, 3 F. Supp. 805 (D, Md. 1933).




In speaking of the allegiance of a shipowner as a basis for im-
posing Jones Act liability on American owners of foreign vessels,
Justice Jackson said:
Until recent times this factor was not a frequent occasion of conflict,
for the nationality of the ship was that of its owners. But it is common
knowledge that in recent years a practice has grown, particularly among
American shipowners, to avoid stringent shipping laws by seeking
foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries. Confronted with
such operations, our courts on occasion have pressed beyond the formali-
ties of more or less nominal foreign registration to enforce against
American shipowners the obligations which our law places upon them.
5 4
In line with this, the Jones Act has been held applicable to a for-
eign seaman's injury occurring in domestic waters on a vessel of
foreign registry owned by a corporation in the country of registry
which was in turn owned and controlled by a company incorporated
in a second country, the latter being owned and controlled by
American citizens. 55 The foreign corporations were treated as if they
were American companies for purposes of the application of the act.
The court also intimated that ownership alone of the foreign cor-
porations was a sufficient contact for the application of the act and
shed doubt on lower court cases requiring both ownership and con-
trol before the act could be applied.
5 6
A foreign seaman may not maintain an action under the Jones
Act against the foreign owner of a foreign vessel for an injury sus-
tained outside the territorial waters of the United States even if
the seaman had been hired in and was returned to the United States
after the voyage. By saying "we do not think the place of contract
is a substantial influence in the choice between competing laws to
govern a maritime tort,"5 7 the Supreme Court rejected a contention
that the Jones Act should be applied in such a case because the
United States was the place of contract. However, the Court did
indicate that considerable weight might be given to a contractual
provision stipulating the law applicable to a tort to a seaman:
Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law
is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.
We are aware of no public policy that would prevent the parties to this
contract, which contemplates performance in a multitude of territorial
jurisdictions and on the high seas, from so settling upon the law of the
54. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 587 (1953).
55. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959).
The court found sufficiently substantial contacts with the United States for
application of the Jones Act. Aside from the corporate ownership structure,
the seaman signed on in the United States where the voyage began and was
to end, and he was regarded as being a resident of the United States.
56. 263 F.2d 437, 443 n.4.
57. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 589 (1953).
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flag-state as their governing code. This arrangement is so -natural and
compatible with the policy of the law that even in the absence of an
express provision it would probably have been implied .. .We think
a quite different result would follow if the contract attempted to avoid
applicable law, for example, so as to apply foreign law to an American
ship.58
The Jones Act, however, is not applicable to an injury sustained
in domestic waters by a foreign seaman on a foreign vessel in the
absence of other contacts with the United States.59 Though until
recently the Supreme Court had expressly left this question open,
60
the Court's expression of a strong preference for a single law ap-
plicable to shipboard torts, i.e., the law of the flag,6 1 made this result
readily predictable. And if the Jones Act is inapplicable to a ship-
board tort, a suit in admiralty between foreigners may be dismissed
in the exercise of a court's discretion.6
B. Collection of Wages by Foreign Seamen on Foreign Ships in
Domestic Ports
In a recent case,6 3 the Supreme Court of the United States presented
a review of domestic law regarding the right of foreign seamen on
foreign ships in domestic ports to collect the wages owed them. An
attempt to surpass the Court's presentation would be useless, and it
is therefore quoted in toto:
In the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, the Congress de-
clared it unlawful to pay a seaman wages in advance and specifically
declared the prohibition applicable to foreign vessels "while in waters
of the United States." Id., at 1169, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 599(e). In
Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918), this Court construed the Act
as not covering advancements "when the contract and payment were
made in a foreign country where the law sanctioned such contract and
payment. ... Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and
payments a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such
an important regulation to be gathered from implication." Id., at 195.
The Court added that "such sweeping and important requirement is not
found specifically made in the statute." Ibid. See also Neilson v. Rhine
Shipping Co., 248 U.S. 205 (1918). In 1920 Congress amended § 4 of the
Seamen's Act of 1915, and granted to every seaman on a vessel of the
United States the right to demand one-half of his then earned wages at
every port the vessel entered during a voyage. 41 Stat. 1006, 46 U.S.C.
§ 597. The section was made applicable to "seamen on foreign vessels
58. Id. at 588-89.
59. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 468 (1959).
60. Plamals v. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
61. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-86 (1953).
62. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 468 (1959);
Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
63. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
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while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States
shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement."
This Court in Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920),
upheld the applicability of the section to a British seaman on a British
vessel under British articles. The Court pointed out:
"taking the provisions of the act as the same are written, we think it
plain that it manifests the purpose of Congress to place American and
foreign seamen on an equality of right in so far as the privileges of this
section are concerned, with equal opportunity to resort to the courts of
the United States for the enforcement of the act. Before the amendment
•.. the right to recover one-half the wages could not be enforced in face
of a contractual obligation to the contrary. Congress, for reasons which
it deemed sufficient, amended the act so as to permit the recovery upon
the conditions named in the statute." Id., at 355.
In 1928, Jackson v. S. S. Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463, was decided by this
Court. It involved advance payments made by a British vessel to
foreign seamen before leaving Manchester on her voyage to New York
and return. It was contended that the advances made in Manchester
were illegal and void. That there was "no intention to extend the pro-
visions of, the statute," the Court said, "to advance payments made by
foreign vessels while in foreign ports, is plain. This Court had pointed
out in the Sandberg case [supra] that such a sweeping provision was not
specifically made in the statute ...." Id., at 470. Soon thereafter several
proposals were made in Congress designed to extend the coverage of the
Seamen's Act so as to prohibit advancements made by foreign vessels in
foreign ports. A storm of diplomatic protest resulted. Great Britain, Italy,
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and Canada all
joined in vigorously denouncing the proposals. In each instance the bills
died in Congress.64
IV. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
The National Labor Relations Act,65 the principal federal statute
regulating labor-management relations affecting interstate and for-
eign commerce, enunciates the rights, duties, privileges, and obliga-
tions of employers and employees and their representatives, usually
unions, in the area of collective bargaining. Among other things, the
act authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to certify the
selected representative of the employees in an appropriate unit as the
exclusive representative of those employees for purposes of collective
bargaining. It also empowers the Board to prevent or restrain certain
unfair labor practices on the part of employers and employee rep-
resentatives.
6 6
64. Id. at 144-46.
65. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
66. Though controversy has raged about the question of the extent to
which this federal legislation has pre-empted the jurisdiction of the states
to deal with problems in the field of labor-management relations, that sub-
ject is beyond the scope of this paper. On this subject, see, e.g., Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 655 (1954); Pub. L. No. 86-257 § 701 (a), 86th Cong.,
1st Sess, 73 Stat. 519, 541 (1959).
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The Board has exercised jurisdiction over foreign corporations if
those corporations are engaged in regular business operations in the
United States or its territories.67 However, there appears to be some
doubt both about the scope of the Board's jurisdiction over labor
relations matters involving foreign contacts and the extent to which
it will exercise any such jurisdiction.
In 1937, the Board was petitioned to hold an election to determine
the collective bargaining representative for certain seamen on the
ships of a number of companies, including at least one foreign
company.68 The Board ordered the election held but refused to include
the seamen of two of the companies. One of the companies was a
British company operating vessels under British registry only. The
nationality of the other company was not mentioned, but it" was not
operating any vessels under American registry. No mention was made
of nationalities of the companies and the vessels whose seamen were
to participate in the certification election, though presumably they
were American, and the Board did not discuss the question of its
jurisdiction over the foreign vessels.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines69 was also decided in 1937 and
involved the certification of a collective bargaining agent. Of the
three employers concerned in one part of the decision, one was a
Canadian company wholly owned by a domestic corporation.7 0 The
Canadian company employed fifteen bus drivers, three of whom were
employed entirely within Canada. The Board found that the drivers
of the Canadian company constituted an appropriate bargaining unit
and certified a union as the exclusive representative of all the com-
pany's drivers,71 including the three drivers employed entirely within
Canada. Again the jurisdictional question was not discussed.
Two years later, however, this same Canadian bus company chal-
lenged an assertion of the Board's jurisdiction in an unfair labor
practice case.72 The company was accused of discharging two drivers
because of their union activities. The trial examiner found that one
employee had been discharged because of "an inexcusable and an
'at-fault' accident" and that the other employee had been discharged
through operation of Canadian law. He recommended dismissal of the
67. See Royal Bank of Canada, 67 N.L.R.B. 403 (1946) (Canadian Corpora-
tion doing a branch bank business in Puerto Rico); Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, 3 N.L.R.B. 622, 660-62 (1937) (Canadian bus company with lines in
the United States). Cf. Delta Match Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1953) (wholly
owned subsidiary of a Swedish corporation doing business in the United
States).
68. American France Line, 3 N.L.R.B. 64 (1937).
69. 3 N.L.R.B. 622 (1937).
70. Id. at 660.
71. Id. at 662.
72. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 13 N.L.R.B. 28 (1939).
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charges based on these discharges. Though he found that other acts
of the company constituted an unfair labor practice, the acts were
not located geographically. The company contested the Board's juris-
diction. The Board did not discuss the question other than to
state the citizenship of the company (Canadian) and its owner
(American) and mention the company's three bus routes. Two of
these routes were exclusively within Canada and only ten percent
of the third lay within domestic territory. The Board added that by
Canadian law all the company's drivers were required to be Canadian
citizens. The case was dismissed with this statement: "Under all the
circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it will not
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over the matters
alleged in this complaint .... "7
These latter two cases should be compared with Detroit & Canada
Tunnel Corp.' 4 There an American company owned a Canadian sub-
sidiary which owned the buses the American company operated be-
tween Canada and the United States. In considering a petition for a
certification election, the Board treated both companies as a single
unit. It found that all of one occupational group of both companies
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit, but it excluded from the
unit those employees who worked exclusively within Canada.75 The
Board remarked,
A generally accepted principle in international law is that one government
will not exercise official, including administrative, functions within the
territory of another government. "[W]ithin the national domain the will
of the territorial sovereign is supreme. That will must, therefore, be
exclusive, opposing the assertion of any other, and excluding the law-
fulness of obedience to the commands of such other. There can be no
conflict of right in this matter."76
73. Id. at 32.
74. 83 N.L.R.B. 727 (1949).
75. This would seem to be in accord with the established practice of the
National Mediation Board which has authority under the Railway Labor
Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 54 Stat. 785-86 (1940), 45 U.S.C. § 151
(1952) to certify the collective bargaining representatives of employees of
carriers by rail and air in the United States. The Mediation Board has
regularly excluded such carriers' employees from voting in representation
elections if they are based in foreign countries. See Detroit & Canada
Tunnel Corp., 83 N.L.R.B. 727, 732 n.10 (1949). Further, it has been held
that the Mediation Board has no authority under the Railway Labor Act
to certify a bargaining representative for foreign-based employees of a
domestic airline. Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189
F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). On the other hand,
the Mediation Board has asserted jurisdiction over employees of foreign
rail and air carriers if the employees are based in domestic territory even
though part of their duties are performed abroad. But the Railway Labor
Act has been held inapplicable to airline employees who are hired and
perform services entirely outside the United States. Air Line Stewards v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1959).
76. 83 N.L.R.B. 727, 732 n.10 (1949).
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Accepting as true the proposition that the will of the territorial
sovereign is supreme within the domain, it goes without saying that
it is sometimes difficult to determine what that will is. This problem
figured prominently in three cases involving employment aboard
vessels of foreign registry in domestic ports. In Compania Maritima
Samsoc Limitada,77 the National Labor Relations Board dismissed
a union's petition to represent employees on a Panamanian vessel
owned by a Panamanian corporation, the majority of whose stock-
holders were not citizens of the United States. The vessel was in
drydock in this country, where the company employed a crew of
foreign seamen to man it. After their employment but before the
ship left the drydock, a domestic union picketed the premises of the
drydock for the purpose of compelling the owners of the vessel to
bargain collectively with the union for the benefit of the seamen.
The Board dismissed a certification petition on the ground that the
internal economy of a foreign vessel was involved. When the drydock
owner, a domestic employer, subsequently charged the union with an
unfair labor practice because of the picketing, the Board assumed
jurisdiction of the case but, on grounds having nothing to do with
the nationality of the vessel, found that no unfair labor practice was
involved.7 8
In the second case, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 9 a foreign
vessel with a foreign crew docked at a domestic port. The voyage
had begun at Bremen, Germany, where a British form of articles of
agreement had been opened. The conditions, including wages and
hours of employment, prescribed by the British Maritime Board were
incorporated in it. While the ship was in the domestic port, the sea-
men instituted a strike to obtain better wages and working con-
ditions and picketed the ship, whereupon they were discharged.
Then several American unions successively picketed the ship for
the purpose of forcing the re-employment of the discharged seamen.
The vessel-owner obtained an injunction against the picketing and
sued both the American unions and their representatives for damages.
Because the picketing was for an unlawful purpose under the law of
the state where it occurred, damages were awarded against the union
representatives. The United States Supreme Court held that Congress
had not intended that the principal federal statute regulating labor
management relations be applied to labor disputes between a foreign
ship and its foreign crew. Therefore, the lawfulness of the Americans'
conduct was properly determinable under the state law. Though this
77. Case No. 20-RC-809, May 1, 1950, CCH N.L.R.B. Decisions, 1950-51,
ff 10,081.
78. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
79. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
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case essentially involved a question of federal supremacy and the
applicability, if any, of state law, the teaching of both cases is that
federal labor relations law is not intended to be applied to the
labor disputes of foreign seamen employed on foreign vessels which
happen to be in American ports.
But the question of what a "foreign" vessel is was before the
Board in the third case80 in which a domestic corporation had sold
two of its vessels to foreign corporations which it had established
and wholly owned. The ships were then registered in the foreign
country and leased to a third foreign corporation which the domestic
company created and owned. This latter corporation leased the vessels
to the domestic company but was obliged to furnish their officers
and crews, though the domestic company could dismiss any of the
employees and otherwise controlled the operation of the vessels. The
crews were composed in part of domestic seamen, but the majority
were nonresident aliens.
Upon a request for a representation election for the crews of these
vessels, the Board examined the facts and asserted its jurisdiction.
The Benz case was distinguished on its facts since in that case the
vessel was owned by foreigners and operated under a foreign registry.
In the instant case, the corporate structure which had been established
was disregarded inasmuch as the Board regarded the foreign cor-
porations as mere instruments of the domestic company and under
its complete control. The ships were not regarded as foreign vessels
since they were based in and operated out of domestic ports in the
same way they had been prior to their transfer to foreign registry.
Accordingly, the Board held that it had jurisdiction over the operator
of the vessels and their crews and ordered a representation election
held.
The case is significant for at least two reasons. First, it demonstrates
the Board's approach to a situation intermediate between one with
almost completely domestic contacts and one in which virtually all
the contacts are foreign. The Board assumed jurisdiction over what
it regarded as essentially a domestic vessel. Second, the case may be
regarded as the beginning of what could become a series of cases
delineating the Board's jurisdiction over "foreign" vessels8' operated
under the so-called "flags of convenience."
80. Peninsular and Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1958).
81. In a case awaiting decision by the Board, a complaint alleging violations
of §§ 8 (a) (1), (3) of the National Labor Relations Act in the transfer of
employees was issued on April 23, 1959, against a domestic corporation which
operated ships, under Liberian registry, between Cuba and the United States.
The vessels were repaired annually in a domestic port and crew members,
all of whom were non-resident aliens, executed their articles of employment
in the United States. It appears that although some of the conduct alleged to
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The act has also been applied to the picketing of a domestic
employer by a domestic union to force him to cease doing business
with a foreign concern which does not maintain labor standards
regarded by the union as "fair."82 In such a case, the Board has said,
83
"although the Board does not have jurisdiction over foreign manu-
facturers as such, it does have jurisdiction over unfair labor practices
occuring in this country and affecting foreign commerce." This state-
ment relates to jurisdiction over domestic activities resulting from
conditions abroad. A case is now before the Board in which a domes-
tic employer has been charged in a complaint issued April 23, 1959,
with the commission of unfair labor practices because of activities
which occurred in part in a foreign country.
84
violate the National Labor Relations Act occurred in the United States, some
did not. West India Fruit & Steamship Co., Inc., 15-CA-1454, NLRB, 1959.
82. Sound Shingle Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1952); Hammermill Paper Co.,
100 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1952). Cf. Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.
W.2d 94 (1951).
83. Sound Shingle Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1161 (1952).
84. See note 81, supra.

